

# AN INTEGRATIVE INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH FOR HUMAN SCIENCES BASED ON ENVY, ADMIRATION, FEAR AND FATHERHOOD

**Thierry Paulmier**

PhD in Economics, PhD Candidate in Political Science, American Academy of Dramatic Arts  
University Paris Est, France

## Abstract:

A proper interdisciplinary approach to the human sciences requires the application of concepts common to all disciplines with the highest relevance in each. We suggest that the concepts of envy, admiration, and fear, together with the concept of fatherhood offer a conceptual framework able to describe human behavior in a wide range of contexts. Indeed, to be a human being is to feel inferior, a condition that gives birth to three major passions: envy, admiration, and fear. On the other hand, to be superior is always to hold the place of a father figure. Then we show that these concepts, which are self-evident in morality, philosophy, theology, and psychology, can be applied broadly as well in anthropology, sociology, economics, and politics. Finally, we conduct a brief case study on gang violence to show the relevance of this conceptual framework.

**Key Words:** Envy, admiration, fear, fatherhood, violence

## Introduction:

An interdisciplinary approach to the human sciences that would enable us to integrate knowledge across disciplines would require the identification of concepts that could be applied in all disciplines, while showing in each of these the highest relevance. We suggest that the concepts of envy, admiration, and fear, applied together with the concept of fatherhood, offer us a conceptual framework able to describe human behavior across the widest range of situations. These concepts belong naturally to morality, philosophy, theology, and psychology, but are more rarely applied in anthropology, sociology, economics, and politics. In the first section, we show that our conceptual framework lies on one essential characteristic of the human condition: inferiority. In the second section, we show that to be in the position of superiority is necessarily to be in the position of a father figure charged with the regulation of inferiors' admiration, envy, and fear. In the third section, we demonstrate that the feeling of inferiority expressed by admiration, envy, and fear, and the superiority expressed by fatherhood, are in fact relevant across the core social sciences. In the last section, we apply our conceptual framework to violence, one of the major questions for human societies and one which invariably requires an interdisciplinary approach.

## 1. To be human is to feel inferior

The original and ontological position of the human being is one of inferiority. Human beings begin their lives in a stage of inferiority, or "weakness"<sup>502</sup>, as the age of childhood was first characterized by Rousseau (1774). During this age, children learn to deal with three main positions relative to others: superiority, equality, and inferiority. Vis-à-vis these three possible positions, the child must develop a "social feeling" that separates him from the animals. In each case, the relationship of the child with the other takes a specific form, as Proudhon (1840) noted: "*in the strong, it is the pleasure of generosity; between equals, it is frank and cordial friendship, in the weak, it is the happiness of admiration and gratefulness*"<sup>503</sup>. However as a matter of fact, the child's original and predominant position, and consequently humanity's original position, is one of inferiority. The social and psychological development of a human being starts with an awareness of inferiority that

<sup>502</sup> J.-J. Rousseau, 1774, *Emile ou de l'éducation*, Livre III, GF-Flammarion, Paris, 1966, p.211.

<sup>503</sup> P.-J. Proudhon, 1840, *Qu'est ce que la propriété?*, chap. V, 1<sup>st</sup> part, §3, Le Monde Flammarion, Paris, 2009, p.250.

needs to be accepted and overcome, especially by learning to express admiration and gratefulness. Throughout life, ontological limits (biological, psychological, and spiritual), will always remind men of their original position and the associated feeling of inferiority. Alfred Adler (1933) argues that the human condition faces the ordeal of inferiority: *“To be human means to feel inferior”*<sup>504</sup>. According to Adler, neuroses are caused by the comparison with others, which generates the “inferiority complex”. The encounter with the neighbor is the encounter with the essential difference, which through comparison is inevitably converted into inferiorities, equalities, and superiorities. Each new encounter is a fresh opportunity to confront once again the inferiority or weakness, which has remained since childhood.

The feeling of inferiority generates three things: admiration, fear and envy. Feelings of inferiority, weakness, smallness, or imperfection can emerge every time the subject encounters any kind of superiority, strength, greatness, or perfection, regardless of whether the comparison be objective or subjective. Faced with a position or a feeling of inferiority, the subject has three possible reactions: admiration, fear, or envy. Admiration is the love of greatness, *“a happy recognition of a ‘superior’ otherness”*<sup>505</sup>. To fear is to feel threatened by something or someone that is perceived as stronger than us. Thus fear is also the implicit admission of inferiority. Envy consists as well in the perception of others as threats: it is the suffering caused by not possessing the superiority of another. And consequently, as Pliny the Younger said: *“To envy it is to admit being inferior”*<sup>506</sup>. The envious feels persecuted, victims of others. In that sense, envy can be seen as a sort of fear. As a matter of necessity, envy contains fear. Those in privileged positions often feel threatened by the envy of the less privileged. Envy and fear lead to hostility, hate, betrayal and aggression. Envy and fear destroy the capacity to admire, although an unhealthy admiration is implicit in envy. *“Jealousy is a secret admiration. A person who admires and feels that he cannot be happy by giving in to his feeling chooses to be jealous of the object of his admiration. Admiration is the happy abandonment of the self, jealousy his unhappy claim”*<sup>507</sup> says Kierkegaard (1849). Fear converts admiration into envy when suddenly the feeling of a threat emerges in admiration. However, admiration can dispel fear and envy because it leads to sympathy, benevolence, devotion, friendship, and love. Each of these three passions triggers two main dynamics of interaction with others respectively: for envy, rivalry and destruction; for fear, destruction and submission; and for admiration, emulation and devotion. Envy focuses on the negative, whereas admiration focuses on the positive. Admiration triggers a non-confrontational mimesis of emulation, whereas envy triggers a conflicting mimesis of appropriation. Likewise, fear triggers a conflicting mimesis of aggression. Thus, we can relate envy and admiration respectively to Veblen’s “predatory” and “workmanship” instincts. Carl Schmitt’s distinction between “friend” and “enemy” can be interpreted as originating respectively in admiration and fear/envy. The three passions emerge from the same position of inferiority. What makes one prevail over another is the psychological reaction of the subject: whether he will accept it (admiration), deny it (envy), or flee from it (fear). If the subject accepts his abasement, he will experience a feeling of humility. On the other hand, if he resists his abasement, he will experience a feeling of humiliation. In the first case, the feeling of inferiority is chosen, in the second case, it is undergone. Humility paves the way to admiration whereas humiliation paves the way to envy. The act of fleeing in case of fear usually gives rise to an even stronger feeling of humiliation than envy. Adler observed that the feeling of inferiority gives birth to a feeling of insecurity and a need for protection. The three passions reveal that human beings need to be protected and recognized by some superiority. In other words, admiration, fear, and envy call for a father. Actually, the father is generally the first experience of superiority in childhood. In other terms, his presence teaches one how to be inferior.

## 2. To be superior is to be like a father

The father also teaches us the way to be superior. For Comte (1851-54), fatherhood is what teaches us to love our inferiors: *“As sons, we learn to venerate our superiors, and as brothers to*

<sup>504</sup> A. Adler, 1933, *Le sens de la vie*, (Trad. H. Schaffer), Éditions Payot, Paris, 1968, Chapter 6, [p.62](#).

<sup>505</sup> M. Crépu, 1988, *La force de l’admiration*, Éditions Autrement, Paris, p.47.

<sup>506</sup> [Pliny the Younger, Letters, VI, XVII.](#)

<sup>507</sup> S. Kierkegaard, 1849, *La maladie à la mort*, 2nd section, Appendix to chapter 1, p129.

*cherish our equals. But it is fatherhood that teaches us directly to love our inferiors.*<sup>508</sup>” He associates goodness narrowly with protection: “*Actual goodness implies always a sort of protection, which, without being incompatible with filial and fraternal relations, does not constitute an essential element of them. It belongs to marriage only for man (...). Paternal affection will maintain its natural aptitude to develop, better than any other affection, the vastest social feeling, the one that pushes us directly to satisfy the needs of our fellows. The protection in it shows spontaneously a charm and an intensity which could not exist elsewhere, because it appears devoid of all equivocal reciprocity.*”<sup>509</sup>” Proudhon defines the social feeling of the strong vis-à-vis the weak as the pleasure of generosity. There is no one who takes more pleasure in generosity towards the weak than the father with his children. Like the “père Goriot” of Balzac, he gives them everything, because he loves them; like Harry Lowman in “Death of a Salesman” he is prepared to die for them. A father is a protective, educative, benevolent, and loving authority who aims to help his son to grow and blossom. The father inspires admiration and assuages fear and envy. Admiration of the father is most notably a product of his force or his courage, which permits him to triumph over fear. By his example, he teaches courage. He represents the ideal superiority because through him admiration prevails over fear: as a superior, he gives justifications and makes decisions that prevent envy vis-à-vis peers, and he gives a model to imitate for relationships with inferiors. Ruskins (1862) suggests that the golden rule of leadership is what we can call “the rule of fatherhood”: “*The way he (the boss) would treat his son, so this should always be the way he treats each of his men. Here is the truthful, practical, or effective RULE we can give on this point to the political economy.*”<sup>510</sup>” In daily life, when we want to communicate that a professor, boss, or other authority figure has made a positive impact on our lives, we usually say: “this person has been like a father for me”. And everybody understands what this means.

### 3. The relevance of “feelings of inferiority” and the “father-like superiority” in social sciences

Now we shall examine whether this conceptual framework can adequately be applied to the core social sciences: social psychology, anthropology, sociology, economics, and politics.

#### 3.1. The rise of the psychology of social emotions

Childhood is the age of admiration because everything is new and surprising. It is the age of fear because everything is a potential threat. It is the age of envy and jealousy because the gap between desires and power is at its maximum. Finally, it is the age of the encounter with the father, through which the child channels these three emotions as notably Freud, Klein, and Adler have shown. Fear is a primary emotion whereas envy and admiration are commonly seen as secondary, social, complex, moral, or intellectual emotions. The seminal work of the psychologist Frijda (1986) provides an analytical framework to describe emotions<sup>511</sup>. A great deal of research has been done to establish a comprehensive taxonomy of emotions. Building notably on Frijda’s works, Elster (1999) has conducted extensive research on the introduction of social emotions into social sciences after having demonstrated the limits of the hypothesis of rationality. His works imply a certain ranking among social emotions: he devotes extensive effort to the analysis of envy on human behavior and its social impact whereas relatively little to fear and almost none to admiration.

#### 3.2. Anthropology shows the universality of social emotions

Admiration, fear, and envy are universal emotions that can be observed in all societies. One shares fear with the animals, whereas admiration and envy are specific to humanity. Admiration, together with fear, is the origin of magical and animist thought, as well as the religious feeling (Vico (1725), Proudhon (1840), Otto (1917)). Admiration is also at the origin of the philosophy (Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes or Schopenhauer). Freud (1927) conceives of religion as a reaction to the childhood experience of powerlessness and dependency vis-à-vis the father. Therefore, the fact that there is no

<sup>508</sup> A. Comte, 1851-54, *Système de politique positive*, Tome II, p.189.

<sup>509</sup> Ibid.

<sup>510</sup> J. Ruskin, 1862, *Unto this Last* (translated in french: *Il n’y a de richesse que la vie*), éditions Pas de côté, Vierzon, 2012, p.42.

<sup>511</sup> N. H. Frijda, 1986, *The Emotions*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Frijda describes each emotion in terms of valence, intensity, intentional object, action tendency, physiological reaction, and cognitive antecedent.

culture without religion means that there is no culture without admiration, fear, and fatherhood. The apparent disenchantment of the world observed by Vico, Weber, Comte, or Proudhon can be interpreted as a loss of the capacity to admire. In his seminal work on envy, Schoeck (1966) argued that: *“At every period of History, at every level of civilization, in most languages, and no matter the forms of the society, men have been aware of one fundamental problem of their existence and have underlined its particular character: the feeling of envy and the fact of being envied.”*<sup>512</sup> He provides numerous examples of envious behaviors in primitive societies (e.g. Navajo, Hopi, Azande). He also notes that envy is universally blamed and condemned. Likewise, Foster (1972) argued that envy is *“a pan-human phenomenon, abundantly present in every society, and present to a greater or lesser extent in every human being.”*<sup>513</sup> The question of the universality of fatherhood is more complex, notably because it requires the discovery of biological fatherhood that was probably not known in primitive human societies. For this reason the primary human societies were likely to be matriarchal, characterized notably by the absence of the role of the biological father in the education of children. In contemporary matriarchal societies, notably in Africa, the “avunculus” or maternal uncle usually replaces the father in the role of a loose father figure.

### 3.3. The discovery of the “relative deprivation” in sociology

Tocqueville grasped and outlined the overarching importance of envy in democratic societies, hidden, in his words, behind the “passion for equality”. Admiration is a fundamental dimension of the social feeling (Proudhon) and is essential for the stability of the social hierarchy (Smith<sup>514</sup>) as well as for the maintenance of trust, cooperation, and solidarity in the society. Conversely, envy and fear dissolve the social order, by generating distrust, conflict (Simmel), violence (Girard), and revolution (Tocqueville). Sociology deals with envy through the notions of “relative deprivation” and “comparative reference group” (Stouffer, Merton, Runciman). In a study on American soldiers, Stouffer (1949) observed that soldiers who belonged to the Military Police, where opportunities for promotion were very poor, were in fact more satisfied with opportunities for promotion than those who belonged to the Air Corps, where opportunities for promotion were conspicuously good. It seems counterintuitive that the better the chances of promotion, the less happy the soldiers. Yet in fact, when promotions are relatively numerous, each expects to be promoted; and consequently those who are not are disappointed and frustrated in comparison with their fellows. As a group, the entire Air Corp is less satisfied as a result. Stouffer and his associates have coined the notion of “relative deprivation” to describe this. Runciman (1966) has offered a more rigorous formulation of the notion of “relative deprivation” by linking it to the notion of “reference group” in his study on the attitudes to social inequality. But the concept of “relative deprivation” as Runciman defines it, is a clinical and sanitized concept - it describes what can be observed and is therefore a tautology. To say that a subject lacking in an element possessed by his fellow is “relatively deprived” is a simple statement of fact, it offers no analysis or causative detail<sup>515</sup>. For Runciman, *“the idea of “relative deprivation” (...) provides the key to the complex and fluctuating relation between inequality and grievance.”*<sup>516</sup> He defends this notion because *“(...) relative deprivation retains the merit of being value-neutral as between a feeling of envy and a perception of injustice. To establish what resentment of inequality can be vindicated by an appeal to social justice will require that this distinction should somehow be made.”*<sup>517</sup> So, “relative deprivation” is value-neutral but to become really useful, additional

<sup>512</sup> H. Schoeck, 1966, L'envie Histoire du mal, (Trad. Georges Pauline), Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 2006, p.7.

<sup>513</sup> G. Foster, 1972, The Anatomy of Envy, A Study in Symbolic Behavior, Current Anthropology, vol. 13, N°2, p.165. He observed personally envious behaviors in villages in Mexico but he found examples of envious behaviors in Mediterranean cultures, in the Arab world, in Asia and in Latin America.

<sup>514</sup> “This disposition to admire, and almost to venerate, the rich and the powerful (...) (is) necessary to both establish and maintain the distinction of ranks and the order of the society (...).” In A. Smith, 1759, Théorie des sentiments moraux, Part I, Section III, chap. III, puf, Paris, 1999, p.103.

<sup>515</sup> Runciman defines it as follows: “we can roughly say that A is relatively deprived of X when (i) he does not have X, (ii) he sees some other person or persons, which may include himself at some previous or expected time, as having X (whether or not this is or will be in fact the case), (iii) he wants X, and (iv) he sees it as feasible that he should have X. Possession of X may, of course, mean avoidance of or exemption from Y.” (p.10).

<sup>516</sup> Runciman, W. G., Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, Gregg Revivals, 1966, p.6.

<sup>517</sup> Ibid., p.10.



investigations must be made to know whether the relative deprivation falls into the category of envy or injustice (which in terms of passion translates into indignation). As a purely descriptive notion, relative deprivation is also static: it does not say anything about the motivations and consequences of individuals' behaviors, whereas envy or indignation as emotions provide "tendency to actions". Looting and vandalism are typically manifestations of social envy. The more costly the destruction for those who perpetrate it, the stronger their envy. Moreover, analysis on envy always needs to be conducted in connection with its relationship to admiration. Smith and Veblen, for instance, have shown that the human need to be admired is essential to preserving good self-esteem. Finally, the notion of relative deprivation is dedicated here to the question of social justice and consequently to possessions. Envy is wider and includes the feeling of deprivation from ontological qualities (beauty, strength etc.).

### ***3.4. The Homo Economicus is an envious and fearful orphan adult interacting with the "inoffensive anonymous"***

Economics supposes that individuals are purely rational: their behavior is determined by their personal interest which consists in maximizing their well-being. In order to do so, they make their choice based on an analysis of costs and benefits. Thanks to game theory, economists are able to examine the decision making process in strategic interactions with others. Let us note that by the classical definition, rational individuals are not supposed to take emotional motivations into account when they make decisions. To discover where this hypothesis can have relevant applications in real life we must locate those circumstances where individuals have no fear, no envy, no admiration, and no fatherhood. This corresponds to situations in which, firstly, individuals do not know those with whom they interact: the others are anonymous. Secondly, individuals are not afraid to be hurt by these anonymous persons because either they feel protected, or they believe that these anonymous persons are "inoffensive". We usually meet "inoffensive anonymous" persons, as economic agents on large and competitive markets (financial markets are probably the best example), or as citizens of a large city where people are civilized and respect the rule of law. In both cases, individuals often remain anonymous in most interactions with the civil society at large. On the other hand, in oligopolistic markets where the number of actors is limited and all are known to each other, the free rider strategy will generate social pressure and retaliations. Indeed, Olson (1965) has shown that the size of the group determines to a large extent the emergence of free riders: the group needs to be big enough to ensure anonymity<sup>518</sup>. Economists describe a peaceful and emotionless world, which corresponds to a "controlled environment". The application of game theory in economics corresponds principally to interactions with the inoffensive anonymous. The "prisoner's dilemma" presents a situation where two accomplices are arrested and interviewed separately (i.e protected from one another but also exposed to betrayal). They should have interest to cooperate with each other (i.e not confess their crime) but find, according to game theory, strong incentives to confess and betray each other because whatever their accomplice chooses as his strategy (to confess or not), the strategy of confession yields a better personal situation<sup>519</sup>. Both of them betray. The situations where a prisoner's dilemma can occur are also often situations of "not seen not caught" (such as free riders, athletes' doping, false illness in the workplace, etc.) and/or where the protagonists cannot communicate with each other. In short, from the hypothesis of people as purely rational actors, who represent the "inoffensive anonymous" for each other, who are not able to communicate with each other and consequently to establish a relationship, and/or who stand in situations of "not seen not caught", the standard economic theory predicts the absence of cooperation, trust, and loyalty between them. Actually, the conclusion is already in the point of departure. Assuming people are selfish, the model tells us that they behave selfishly. It is tautological and lies on a petition of principle: we assume what should be demonstrated. Moreover, it is not certain that the hypothesis of rationality does not include passions. In fact, the idea of maximization of self satisfaction betrays (1) the exclusive concern of the self, (2) the violent desire to enjoy and to possess, (3) the fear to lose, to be a loser and to feel inferior because

<sup>518</sup> M. Olson, 1965, *Logique de l'action collective*, Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, (trad. Mario Levi), 2011.

<sup>519</sup> By confessing, if my accomplice stays silent I maximize my gain, if he betrays me I minimize my penalty. My accomplice has the same reasoning.

of losing, together with the unpleasant feeling that someone else is gaining more, (4) a total absence of filial feelings in the case of inferiority and paternal feelings in the case of superiority. In a nutshell, the hypothesis of rationality implies invariably selfishness, greed, fearfulness, envy, and domination. Hirschman (1977) has shown that the notion of “interest” was elaborated only in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries as the insertion of a third term between reason and passion, which was supposed to borrow the best of these two types by giving birth to a sort of reasonable self-love. But it corresponds in reality to “*the accession of cupidity to the rank of privileged passion in charge of subduing dangerous passions and of bringing a substantial contribution to the art of government.*”<sup>520</sup> Therefore, it is difficult to believe in the methodological amorality of economics<sup>521</sup>. Is it a coincidence that students of economics are less cooperative than their peers who do not study economics? (Frank et al, 1993) In real life, those who most typically embody the Homo Economicus are immature and poorly socialized adults. Fortunately, experiments undertaken by economists show that in real situations, people cooperate, are trustworthy and loyal, thus contradicting the predictions of the standard economic model. These experiments show that the hypothesis of rationality is limited to interactions with inoffensive anonymous agents. For instance, some experiments demonstrate that when players have the opportunity to communicate before the game, the level of cooperation increases tremendously (Sally, 1995), especially when it takes place “face to face” (Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1998). Indeed, in this case, they no longer play with an anonymous agent but with a specific person they have met that has consequently and inevitably affected them emotionally. This person has become familiar, which completely changes the subject’s behavior. Sally (1995, 2000) also observes that the degree of familiarity between partners influences the cooperation rate (physical and social contact, shared preferences and opinions, etc.). Gächter and Fehr (1999) have shown that when a little familiarity between people has been established (“team spirit effect”), and that at the end of the game their respective contribution to the public good will become public (“social pressure effect”), the level of cooperation increases substantially. In consequence, the theory of rational choice cannot be extended to all realms of human behaviors such as criminality, marriage or family as Gary Becker (1976, 1991) attempted to do. It can only be applied to relationships between inoffensive anonymous agents which cannot communicate with each other and/or who are in a situation of “not seen not caught”. Once we know the persons, emotions are necessarily involved (especially admiration, envy, fear, and fatherhood).

Proper interpretation of admiration and envy can also help us to better understand the value of objects and the determination of their price. In the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759), Smith noted that people’s consumption beyond “the necessity of nature” (food, housing, clothing) is driven by the need to be admired (and thus approved of) and consequently by the envy of greatness and distinction. Veblen (1899) has followed this intuition, showing that not all human action has a goal determined by the calculation of pains and pleasures. He developed the notions of “*conspicuous consumption*” and “*invidious comparison*” to explain the need to gain distinction and others’ esteem or consideration through inciting others’ envy. Classical economists could not solve the “paradox of the water and the diamond” formulated by Adam Smith: there is nothing more useful than water and yet it has almost no exchange value, whereas diamonds are totally useless but have a high exchange value. Neoclassic economists found a solution by developing the notion of “marginal utility”: the utility of the last unit of a good available for our consumption. Diamonds are scarce whereas water is abundant. That is why water has no exchange value and a diamond a high one. However, many objects are scarce and yet have no exchange value, such as a lame and one-eyed donkey. The object needs also to be commonly admired. Ruskin has this intuition: “*The price of gold depends less of its scarcity – which is in common with cerium or iridium – than from its solar color and its inalterable purity, by which it arouses admiration and gains mankind’s confidence.*”<sup>522</sup> Thus, an additional element needs to be

<sup>520</sup> A. O. Hirschman, 1977, *The Passions and the Interests*, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Les passions et les intérêts, Quadrige puf, Paris, 1980, (Trad. Pierre Andler), p.41.

<sup>521</sup> Frank et al (1993) have observed a cooperation rate of 61,2% by non-economics students against 39,6% for economics students. Moreover, the cooperation rate decreases along the cursus of the students in economics whereas it increases for non-economists, tending to show that the more we study economics the more selfishly we behave, unless economics attracts people who are already selfish.

<sup>522</sup> J. Ruskin, op.cit., p.99.

added to the explanation of marginal utility in order for the paradox to be resolved adequately: that element is admiration. People admire the beauty of diamonds, and can posture superiority vis-à-vis others through their possession, whereas water, though beautiful, is incapable of inspiring admiration in terms of possession, owing to its abundance. Admiration for diamonds determines the intensity of the desire to acquire the object, or what Ruskin calls “*the force of consumer’s intention to buy*”<sup>523</sup>. The notion of use value is too narrowly linked to physiological and security needs (food, clothes, house, etc.). But once we move up Maslow’s hierarchy in order to satisfy our needs in terms of belonging, esteem, and self actualization, we increasingly purchase objects that are useless but covetable and admired by others. We buy objects because we admire them in others. In developed economies, the share of goods that are useless but highly admirable is increasing and represents the largest portion of the consumer’s basket of goods. In the 19th century, Ruskin already noticed that: “*Three-fourths of the world demand is romantic, founded on visions, idealisms, hopes, and affections; and the regulation of the purse is, in essence, the regulation of the imagination and the heart. The true discussion on the nature of price is therefore a metaphysical and material problem of first importance.*”<sup>524</sup> A good gains in value at a rate comparable with an increasing number of admirers. The number of admirers determines, for instance, the value of a painting, a song, a movie, or a show.

### 3.5. People are governed through admiration, envy, fear, and fatherhood

The central question of power in politics can be reshuffled by starting from the psychological impression made on individuals by those who govern. As Ferrero (1945) says: “*The right to command can only be justified by the superiority.*”<sup>525</sup> At the psychological level, this means that the government has managed to ensure its position by leading with a mixture of admiration, envy, fear, and fatherhood.

#### Government by admiration

Sacred and supernaturally justified governments lead people mainly by admiration and awe, whether the chief is a god, a son of a god, in communication with spirits, ancestors or gods, or lieutenant of God on earth. The power “comes from above”. Heroic or aristocratic governments justify admiration as well, when they are what Vico (1725) calls the “*government of the most powerful*”<sup>526</sup>. The prestige is acquired by heroic actions. In the Middle Ages and during the Renaissance, the genre of *Mirrors for Princes* (e.g. *John Salisbury*, *Gilles de Rome*), as well as the literature on knighthood, aimed to erect the prince as a model of virtue and an example for his people. This barrier of manners between the prince and his people is supposed to inspire admiration and affection. Following the tradition of the *Mirrors for Princes*, albeit in a revolutionary perspective, Machiavelli still devotes one chapter of “The Prince” to the ways in which “a prince must behave to acquire esteem” and another one to the ways he can “avoid contempt and hatred”. He recognizes that “*the best fortress in the world (for a prince) is the affection of the people*”<sup>527</sup>. And this requires that he is admired by them. Whether the prestige is supernatural or acquired by heroic actions or virtues, the government needs to regularly display its power and its wealth to the governed so as to maintain order. The leader feels the necessity to shine or to disappear. That is why he provides food, gifts (e.g. potlatch), and games. In modern times, admiration and awe are still major instruments of government. The divinity of the leader has been replaced by his exemplary character, behavior, and merits (e.g. Gandhi, De Gaulle, Lech Walesa, Nelson Mandela). Totalitarian regimes have also tried to use admiration as a mode of government through the cult of personality of their leaders (e.g. Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Mao, etc.). Admiration proceeds from a spiritual distance or superiority between the government and the governed, created by the supernatural, heroism, virtues, or donations, which act to dispel people’s envy. Admiration stimulates the “good will”, i.e. the tendency to cooperate, to devote, and to sacrifice. These sorts of regimes maximize spontaneous obedience, loyalty, and devotion (up to

<sup>523</sup> Ibid., p.100.

<sup>524</sup> Ibid., p.113.

<sup>525</sup> G. Ferrero, 1945, *Le pouvoir*, Livre de poche, 1988, p.25.

<sup>526</sup> G. Vico, 1725, *La science nouvelle*, p.442.

<sup>527</sup> Machiavel, *Le Prince*, Chapter XX, p.115.

self-sacrifice) to the chief. Admiration leads to trust whereas envy and fear lead to distrust. The government by admiration creates the conditions for the emergence of an elite or an aristocracy. However, it must be noted that true admiration is an objective that cannot be directly sought because it normally emerges as a secondary effect of another action. Therefore, wanting to be admired is often the best way of failing to be so. True admiration comes to those who do not seek it.

### Government by fear

Canetti (1960) asserts that the “primitive order” derives from the flight instinct dictated by the presence of a stronger animal. The primitive order is a death penalty, which forces the victim to flee<sup>528</sup>. Hobbes argues that human beings are naturally fearful, especially of being killed. Men “*fear each other rather than love each other*”<sup>529</sup>. For Hobbes, reciprocal fear has been at the very beginning of the civil society and the emergence of power: “*(...) the spirits of men are of such a nature, that if they are not detained by the fear of some sort of common power, they will fear each other, they will live with each other in an abiding distrust (...)*”<sup>530</sup>. History shows indeed that times of anomie, anarchy, and revolution produce a tyrant who would restore a safe and peaceful social order. Machiavelli suggested that, in the case of a new power, it is easier to govern by fear than by love: “*it is much more certain to be feared than to be loved (...) And men hesitate less to offend someone who wants to be loved than another who wants to be feared; because the link of love is spun of recognition: a fiber that men do not hesitate to break, because they are nasty, as soon as their personal interest is at stake; but the link of fear is spun by the fear of punishment that never leaves them.*”<sup>531</sup> Indeed, fear is a powerful instrument of government because it weakens and constrains the will of individuals. It creates a master-slave relationship because a frightened person is no longer free; he is forced to submit to ensure his security and protection or to flee if he can. The tyrant or the despot becomes both persecutor and protector. Tyrants, totalitarian states, mafias, and gangs govern essentially by fear. This implies the use of threats, intimidation, force, and violence. As Ferrero (1945) said, “*force is fear in action*”<sup>532</sup>. History shows however that governments which rely extensively on fear are unstable and not viable in the long run. They need to obtain the free consent of the governed; without it, the threat of revolution is always on the horizon. Justifiably therefore, those who govern by fear are inevitably fearful. They fear that the tables will be turned, and they will be forced to undergo the fate they have forced upon others. The despot, says Ferrero (1945), “*is afraid of everything: by the most reserved and the most cautious critic, by the most innocent manifestation of discontentment that broods everywhere*”<sup>533</sup>. But for Ferrero (1945), regardless of whether or not the power uses fear, it is in its nature to feel fragile: “*The Power is never safe, it constantly trembles.*”<sup>534</sup> Accordingly, “*(t)he unique authority who has no fear is the one who is born of love: the paternal authority, for instance.*”<sup>535</sup>

### Government by envy

Politics is about regulating the envy of all against all. Schoeck (1966) suggests that the societies and civilizations that have reached the highest levels of development might in fact have been those that managed envy better than others. Indeed, envy threatens to ostracize or kill those who are bright and innovative. In Antiquity, for instance, Athens and a few other cities practiced ostracism, which consisted of a vote by the assembly of citizens to single out one citizen for banishment. According to Plutarch, ostracism was a manifestation of envy: “*Ostracism was not a punishment inflicted on guilty persons, it was called, to veil it with a specious name, a weakening, a reduction of an authority too proud of itself, of a power of which the weight was too heavy. It was, in reality, a*

<sup>528</sup> E. Canetti, 1960, *Masse et puissance*, Tel Gallimard, 1966, pp.321-322.

<sup>529</sup> T. Hobbes, *Le citoyen*, (Trad. Samuel Sorbière), GF-Flammarion, Paris, 1982, p.91.

<sup>530</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.71-72.

<sup>531</sup> Machiavel, *Le prince*, Chapter 17, *Le Livre de poche*, 1983, pp.87-88.

<sup>532</sup> G. Ferrero, *op. cit.*, p.310.

<sup>533</sup> *Ibid.*, p.48.

<sup>534</sup> *Ibid.*, p.37.

<sup>535</sup> *Ibid.*, p.37.



*moderate satisfaction that one granted to envy (...)*<sup>536</sup>. Numerous societies throughout history have imposed special taxes on luxury goods to limit their consumption, and envy accordingly. Progressive taxation on income and redistribution policies aim to satisfy envy as well. Conversely, “divide and conquer” tactics (“Divide ut regnes”) usually excite envy among peers. This creates a power vacuum which the conqueror is able to use to his advantage. It consists of dividing people into categories to encourage their opposition to each other by claiming that some of them benefit from privileges that the others should have as well (rich/poor, white/black, men/women, etc.). To acquire power, political leaders promise to either provide all people with the same privileges or rather to abolish them outright. For Elster (1999), “(p)olitical systems that are both egalitarian and totalitarian seem to spawn envy. In China, during the Cultural Revolution, farmers with fruit trees were ordered to cut them down.”<sup>537</sup> The principle followed here is that “nobody shall have what not all can have”. Democratic societies are also particularly exposed to this tendency toward egalitarianism, which in a way is the modern terminology for envy. Tocqueville has shown that equal social conditions intensify envy among citizens. “Scapegoating” is another ancestral mechanism employed to manipulate envy and to restore unanimity in the society. It consists of accusing a person, a group or a minority of responsibility for all of the evils in the society. Scapegoating functions by managing to unite the rest of the society against this victim (e.g. Oedipus accused of being guilty of the plague in Thebes and banished). Scapegoats are at the core of ideologies such as Marxism or Nazism. Envy deviates the will towards objectives detrimental to social harmony. It stimulates the “bad will” i.e. the tendency to be non-cooperative, aggressive, and to sacrifice the others. These sorts of regimes maximize spontaneous disobedience, disloyalty, and rebellion.

### Government by fatherhood

Throughout the Ancient Regime, power was epitomized by the king, and the king was the embodiment of the father figure (Aristotle, St Thomas of Aquinas, Filmer, Bossuet). The essence of the monarchy was founded on fatherhood. Government by fatherhood is a synthesis of the three other forms. Against fear, the government by fatherhood offers protection. Protection is traditionally the principal kingly function. But in contrast with the government by fear, the proper government by fatherhood does not generate fear, as in a tyranny. Against envy, it offers justice and unity in the style of King Solomon or King Saint Louis. In contrast with the government by envy, it does not excite envy, it does not divide the people in order to dominate them, it does not promote egalitarianism, and it does not designate a scapegoat. In addition, against fear and envy, it offers clemency, benevolence, and sacrificial love. As in the government by admiration, it proceeds from a spiritual distance or superiority that prevents it from becoming the object of envy. But it refuses to be idolatized. The government by fatherhood inspires the same “good will” as the government by admiration, but it does this to an even higher degree.

### 4. A Case study on violence: The Maras

The gangs of Central America known as the “Maras”<sup>538</sup> are considered to be the most organized and the most violent in the world. These gangs are made up of children and young people between the ages of 9 and 25 from the poorest districts. Most of them are fatherless. Harper and McLanahan (2004) show that fatherless children are more likely to become criminals. Fatherless children enter these gangs essentially in search of the love and protection that their families are unable to provide for them. William Alexander, MS13 member, explains his decision to become a “marero” as follows: “I joined the MS13 when I was 13 years old. My father died in the war. My mother was alone with my three little brothers. This gang controlled the district. I found another “family” there.”<sup>539</sup> Alex Sanchez, former MS13 member, gives a similar explanation about what young people expect to find when they enter the gangs: “It becomes like another family that provides love for them.

<sup>536</sup> Plutarch, Parallel Lives, Tome II, Aristides.

<sup>537</sup> J. Elster, 1999, *Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions*, Cambridge University Press, p.176

<sup>538</sup> “Mara” is the diminutive of “marabunta” which is a destructive species of ant. There are two main Maras: “Mara 18” and “Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS 13)”.

<sup>539</sup> “Les Maras, du Canada au Panama - United violence of Americas”, Le devoir, 24 January 2006.

*They find girlfriends, there is money, and there are drugs. The issue is that they really feel part of something, part of a group, and above all they find a sense of recognition and respect as part of the gang.*<sup>540</sup> Alex Sanchez gives three major reasons for this: the search for a refuge, which dispels their feeling of insecurity generated to a large extent by the absence of a father, envy of gang members' possessions (money, girls, drugs, prestige), and a need for admiration. Brenda Paz, MS13 member, describes the value system of the mareros as follows: *"First of all, there is God, your mother, and then your gang. We live for God and for our mother, we die for our gang."*<sup>541</sup> There is no reference to the father: he is not in the picture because he is not in their lives. In the documentary *La Vida Loca* (2009), the director Christian Poveda shows a mother and her son before a judge in El Salvador. The mother confesses that her son overwhelms her. Her husband has left her and he does not take care of his children. She raises them alone. Her 17-year-old son does not listen to her and prefers to listen to his gang. She starts to cry. In the absence of an authority at home, children and teenagers strive to find one in the gangs. This situation can be observed in most places where gangs have emerged. In Haiti, for instance, the Child Soldiers Global Report 2008 indicates that: *"At Cité Soleil (a poor district), some chiefs of gangs have adopted a sort of parental status with children – who were lacking affection and of models of authority- and were often called "uncle" or "father".*<sup>542</sup> The UK riots in August 2011 were called the "shopping riots"<sup>543</sup> (i.e. "envious riots") by The Guardian. James Cameron explained that most of the children who participated in the riots were fatherless.<sup>544</sup>

### Conclusion:

Aristotle, Descartes, the French Moralists, Hume, and Smith, among others, all believed that the analysis of passions was necessary to understanding human nature. The 20th century has largely neglected the discussion of human passions because of the domination of functionalism, structuralism, and the theory of rational choice on the social sciences. The theory of rational choice, together with game theory, is still in a domination position, as it provides us with an elegant and integrative interdisciplinary approach to the social sciences. But it also means applying the economic approach to all human behaviors. It implies the belief that emotions can be the result of a rational choice through a cost-benefit analysis combining material and emotional satisfactions and costs. Becker defended this position: *"the economic approach does not draw conceptual distinctions between major and minor decisions, such as those involving life and death in contrast to the choice of a brand of coffee; or between decisions said to involve strong emotions and those with little emotional involvement, such as in choosing a mate or the number of children in contrast to buying paint (...).*<sup>545</sup> In keeping with this insight, this paper has strived to sketch another integrative interdisciplinary approach of human behavior based on the most critical emotions experienced throughout the social life, as they originate in the ontological position of human beings (inferiority). Indeed, the daily news tends to show us that the rise of violent behaviors throughout the world seems to be caused mostly by fear, envy, and fatherlessness (criminality, mafias, gangs, terrorism, arms race, etc.). The social sciences are in need of a conceptual framework capable of explaining and arresting these phenomena.

<sup>540</sup> Documentary Enquête exclusive, "MS13 the gang that terrorizes America", 24/09/06, M6.

<sup>541</sup> Ibid.

<sup>542</sup> Child Soldiers Global report 2008, p.163.

<sup>543</sup> Williams Z., "The UK riots: the psychology of looting", The Guardian, Tuesday 9 August 2011.

<sup>544</sup> "I don't doubt that many of the rioters out last week have no father at home. Perhaps they come from one of the neighbourhoods where it's standard for children to have a mum and not a dad.....where it's normal for young men to grow up without a male role model, looking to the streets for their father figures, filled up with rage and anger. So if we want to have any hope of mending our broken society, family and parenting is where we've got to start." D. Cameron, PM's speech on the fighback after the riots, Monday 15 August 2011. See : <http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-on-the-fightback-after-the-riots/>

<sup>545</sup> G. Becker, 1976, The Economic approach to Human Behavior, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp.7-8.

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